P L D 2026 Islamabad 72

P L D 2026 Islamabad 72

Before Babar Sattar, J

Mirza SALMAN BABAR BEG ---Petitioner

Versus

FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary, Establishment

Division and others ---Respondents

Writ Petition No. 2465 of 2023, decided on 3rd November, 2025.

(a) Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act

(IV of 2010)---

----Ss. 3, 4 & Preamble---Government Servants (Efficiency and

Discipline) Rules, 1973, Rr. 2, 3 & 9---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.

199---Constitutional petition---Misconduct---Disciplinary

proceedings---Harassment at workplace---Proceedings---Object,

purpose and scope---Petitioner / civil servant was aggrieved of show

cause notice issued to him regarding departmental inquiry on the

allegation of sexual harassment of a female employee---Validity---

Proceedings initiated under provisions of Government Servants

(Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973 are a matter between Federal

Government in its capacity as an employer and a civil servant in

his/her capacity as an employee---Purpose of such proceedings is to

ensure that an employee is abiding by the terms and conditions of

service prescribed for purposes of his/her conduct in discharge of

his/her duties---Object and scope of Protection Against Harassment

of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010 is altogether different as the

rationale for enactment of such law, as explained in its Preamble, is

to provide for protection of women from harassment at workplace---

Set of facts on the basis of which a complaint was founded against

accused under provisions of Protection Against Harassment of

Women at the Workplace Act, 2010 needed to be inquired into,

which if proved, consequences and penalties prescribed under

Protection Against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010

were to flow toward petitioner / civil servant---Proceedings under

Protection Against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010

are adversarial in nature, where a complainant makes allegations

against an accused and the same have to be proved on the basis of

cogent evidence---Penalties prescribed in terms of S. 4 of Protection

Against Harassment of Women At the Workplace Act, 2010 may be

similar to, or overlap with, the penalties prescribed in terms of R. 4

of Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973, and

the same has no bearing on the object, purpose and effect of the

proceedings under Protection Against Harassment of Women at the

Workplace Act, 2010 on one hand and Government Servants

(Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973, on the other---High Court declined to interfere in show cause notice issued to petitioner / civil

servant--- Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances.

Nadia Naz v. The President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan PLD

2023 SC 588; Raja Tanveer Safdar v. Mrs. Tehmina Yasmeen and others

PLD 2024 SC 795; Faraz Naveed v. District Police Officer Gujrat 2022

SCMR 1770; Imran Amir v. Mst. Ismat Bibi and another 2023 CLC 1059;

Dr. Sohail Hassan Khan v. Director General (Research), Livestock and

Dairy Development Department, Punjab 2020 SCMR 1708; Asif

Mehmood Butt v. Regional CEO, NBP 2011 PLC (C.S.) 1462; Falak Sher v.

Inspector General Police, Lahore 2005 SCMR 1020; DIG of Police v.

Anees ur Rehman Khan PLD 1985 SC 134; Syed Muhammad Iqbal Jafri

v. Registrar, Lahore High Court 2004 PLC (C.S.) 809; Saifur Rahman v

Chairman, National Accountability Bureau PLD 2022 SC 409;

Muhammad Ashraf v. The State 1995 SCMR 626; The State v. Jehangir

Akhtar 2018 SCMR 733; I.A. Sherwani v. Government of Pakistan 1991

SCMR 1041; Pir Muhammad v. Government of Balochistan 2007 SCMR

54 and Muhammad Hassan Ullah v. Chief Secretary Government of

Balochistan 2025 SCMR 134 ref.

(b) Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973---

----R.3---Disciplinary proceedings---Scope---Proceedings under

Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973 are not

necessarily adversarial in nature---Such proceedings are meant to

confirm and ensure that terms and conditions of service prescribed

for purposes of Civil Servants Act, 1973 including requirements as to

conduct and efficiency of an employee, are being complied with.

Muhammad Shoaib Shaheen, Advocate Supreme Court for

Petitioner.

Raja Muhammad Jawad Arsalan, Assistant Attorney General for

Respondents.

Muhammad Ahmad Pansota, Barrister Scheherzaday Shehryar and

Guzel Mobeen for Respondent No.4.

Sher Alam Khan and Zeeshan Raza Zaidi, SOs, Establishment

Division for Respondents.

Ms. Zaib Tayyab, Director SS(A) and Ghulam Mustafa, APS, MOFA for

Respondents.

Date of hearing: 26th August, 2025.

JUDGMENT

BABAR SATTAR, J.---The petitioner has impugned a show-cause

notice ( SCN ) dated 27.07.2023 issued in terms of Rules 2,3 and 9 of the Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 2020 ( E&D Rules )

along with a charge sheet dated 21.10.2022.

2. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the subject-

matter of the inquiry relates to a complaint of sexual harassment

made by an employee of the Consulate General of Pakistan, Barcelona,

against the petitioner, who was Consul General at the relevant time.

He submitted that based on the complaint, the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs initiated proceedings under the E&D Rules, and after a fact

finding inquiry the impugned SCN was issued. He submitted that

respondent No.4 simultaneously also filed a complaint before the

Ombudsman for Protection Against Harassment of Women at the

Workplace ( Ombudsman ) under the Protection against Harassment of

Women at the Workplace Act, 2010 ("Harassment Act") and

proceedings continued under provisions of the Harassment Act by the

Ombudsman based on the same allegation. He submitted that in the

presence of the special law (i.e. Harassment Act) the same set of facts

could not be basis of an inquiry and disciplinary proceedings under

the E&D Rules because the special law would trump the general law.

He further stated that the continuation of two proceedings, one under

the special law (i.e. Harassment Act) and the other under the E&D

Rules was tantamount to double jeopardy and consequently the

impugned SCN was ultra vires the law. He further submitted that by

order dated 10.02.2023, the Ombudsman found that the complaint filed

pursuant to provisions of the Harassment Act was maintainable

notwithstanding that an inquiry was also being conducted against the

petitioner pursuant to the E&D Rules. A representation against this

order of the Ombudsman was filed before the President who by order

dated 13.07.2023 upheld the same, which was brought on record

through C.M. No.1696 of 2025. The petitioner also brought on record

order dated 07.04.2025 passed by the Ombudsman dismissing the

complaint filed against the petitioner by respondent No.4 on the basis

that the charge that the petitioner had sexually harassed respondent

No.4 had not been proved on the basis of cogent evidence. He

submitted that the petitioner could not be simultaneously proceeded

against under provisions of the Harassment Act and the E&D Rules.

And once the complaint against the petitioner had been dismissed by

the Ombudsman on the basis that the charges of harassment had not

been proved, there was no basis to continue with proceedings under

the E&D Rules.

3. Learned Assistant Attorney-General submitted that the inquiry

against the petitioner in terms of provisions of the E&D Rules may

have been triggered by the complaints filed by respondent No.4, an

independent complaint filed by respondent No.4 before the

Ombudsman under provisions of the Harassment Act did not create a

bar against the Federal Government proceeding against the petitioner

under provisions of the E&D Rules. He submitted that pursuant to

complaints received by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs ( MOFA ) from

respondent No.4 dated 17.06.2022, 18.06.2022 and 09.07.2022, MOFA

solicited the views of Pakistan's Ambassador to Madrid. The Pakistan's Ambassador to Spain informed MOFA that the petitioner had admitted

to having an affair with respondent No.4 while asserting that the same

was consensual. The Ministry then constituted a fact-finding team

comprising two Ambassadors who visited Barcelona to ascertain

relevant facts. By report dated 03.08.2022, the fact-finding team

concluded that the petitioner was liable for inappropriate behavior

and that the petitioner ought to be recalled from Spain. The fact-

finding team comprising Pakistan's Ambassador to Bulgaria and

Pakistan's Ambassador to Poland concluded that there was evidence of

harassment in the tone and language used by the petitioner while

communicating with respondent No.4. And further that the petitioner

as Consul General in Barcelona, being Head of Mission, had not

discharged his responsibility to manage the circumstances that

resulted in the filing of the complaints by respondent No.4. Meanwhile,

respondent No.4 filed civil and criminal proceedings against the

petitioner in Barcelona in which Pakistan's Consulate in Barcelona was

also made a respondent. MOFA therefore concluded, after seeking

legal advice, that the petitioner ought to be recalled to Pakistan. For

such purpose, the Prime Minister approved the summary dated

06.08.2022. Subsequently, the Prime Minister constituted an Inquiry

Committee on 10.10.2022 under provisions of the E&D Rules. The

Inquiry Committee recommended on 07.07.2023 that the penalty of

dismissal from service might be imposed on the petitioner. And in

view of such recommendation the impugned SCN was issued to the

petitioner. He submitted that the administrative and disciplinary

proceedings being undertaken under provisions of the E&D Rules had

no co-relation with the complaint filed by respondent No.4 against the

petitioner under provisions of the Harassment Act. Both complaints

could continue simultaneously and any consequences produced for the

petitioner as an outcome of such proceedings would not cause double

jeopardy to the petitioner. He further submitted that the petition was

not maintainable as the SCN under provisions of the E&D Rules was a

step taken to enforce the terms and conditions of service of the

petitioner. Such proceedings could not be impugned before the High

Court in its constitutional jurisdiction in view of Article 212 of the

Constitution.

4. Learned counsel for respondent No.4 submitted that the

provisions of Article 13 of the Constitution that afforded protection

against double jeopardy were not attracted in the instant matter. He

submitted that the manner in which harassment was defined under

the Harassment Act had a narrower scope than that afforded to the

term under the E&D Rules. He submitted that Section 12 of the

Harassment Act provided that the provisions of such Act were in

addition to and not in derogation of any other law for the time being

in force. This was meant to provide an additional protection to women

within their workplaces and to protect the right of dignity afforded to

women. He submitted that Article 13 and the protection it afforded

related to criminal prosecution and not disciplinary proceedings

under the E&D Rules or civil proceedings under provisions of the Harassment Act. He contended that the argument of the learned

counsel for the petitioner that provisions of the Harassment Act had

impliedly repealed provisions of the E&D Rules was misconceived. The

doctrine of implied repeal could only be used where the provisions of

a law incorporated later in time were completely inconsistent with or

contradictory to the provisions of an earlier law, such that both sets of

provisions could not stand together. He submitted that no such case

was made out when provisions of the Harassment Act were juxtaposed

against provisions of the Civil Servants Act, 1973, read with the E&D

Rules. He argued that proceedings under the Harassment Act as well as

the E&D Rules could continue simultaneously, as both sets of law were

special laws that had primacy within their particular domains. For

such proposition, he relied on Nadia Naz v. The President of the

Islamic Republic of Pakistan (PLD 2023 SC 588), Raja Tanveer Safdar v.

Mrs. Tehmina Yasmeen and others (PLD 2024 SC 795), Faraz Naveed v.

District Police Officer Gujrat (2022 SCMR 1770), Imran Amir v. Mst.

Ismat Bibi and another (2023 CLC 1059), Dr. Sohail Hassan Khan v.

Director General (Research), Livestock and Dairy Development

Department, Punjab (2020 SCMR 1708), Asif Mehmood Butt v. Regional

CEO, NBP (2011 PLC (C.S.) 1462) and Falak Sher v. Inspector General

Police, Lahore (2005 SCMR 1020).

5. Before we consider the primary question of law that arises in the

instant petition, i.e. whether simultaneous proceedings against a

citizen pursuant to provisions of the Harassment Act and the E&D

Rules constitutes double jeopardy and undermines the guarantee

provided by Article 13 of the Constitution, let us briefly take note of

the factual background in which the controversy has arisen.

Respondent No.4 was a local employee of Pakistan's Consulate General

in Barcelona. She alleged that she had been sexually harassed by the

petitioner, who at the relevant time was the Consul General in

Barcelona. She filed complaints with the MOFA, which was her

employer. In view of the sensitivity of the matter, MOFA constituted

the fact-finding team comprising two senior diplomats who were

serving as ambassadors in neighboring countries. The fact-finding

team visited Barcelona and concluded that a case of harassment was

made out along with a case of mismanagement on part of the

petitioner as Consul General. Respondent No.4 meanwhile pursued

other legal remedies. These remedies included filing of civil and

criminal proceedings in Spain as well as the filing of a complaint

before the Ombudsman under provisions of the Harassment Act.

MOFA, after seeking legal advice and considering questions of

immunity afforded to a Consular Officer as well as the consequences

that may flow to Pakistan as a sovereign with its presence in Spain,

sought to recall the petitioner from his position in Barcelona.

6. The issues that emerged as a consequence of the fact-finding

inquiry undertaken by the fact-finding team appointed by MOFA

included the question of harassment, the question of efficient

management of the Consulate General in Barcelona under the

petitioner's watch, and the question of management of funds and personnel at the Consulate General in Barcelona. In other words, the

matters flagged by the fact-finding team were of a wider import than

allegations of sexual harassment. It was in this background that the

Prime Minister, on the recommendation of MOFA, ordered that the

petitioner be recalled from Barcelona and ordered the initiation of an

inquiry under provisions of the E&D Rules, which subsequently

resulted in the issuance of the impugned SCN.

7. During the initial stages of fact-finding being undertaken by

MOFA, the record reflects that the petitioner invited MOFA to initiate a

proper inquiry under the E&D Rules to enable him to clear his name of

charges impugning his reputation and integrity. He also objected to the

proceedings pending before the Ombudsman on the basis that as he

was being proceeded under the E&D Rules and thus the Ombudsman

had no jurisdiction in the matter. This argument did not find favour

with the Ombudsman. His representation against the Ombudsman

finding was then dismissed by the President by order dated 13.07.2023

while noting that proceedings against an employee under the E&D

Rules could be initiated on grounds of misconduct, inefficiency and

corrupt practices. The scope of the Harassment Act was much more

limited and the objective of initiating proceedings under the

Harassment Act was to ascertain whether workplace harassment had

taken place in terms of the definition of harassment provided under

section 2(h) of the Harassment Act. It was further observed that the

procedure prescribed for purposes of an inquiry under the

Harassment Act, including the constitution of an inquiry committee in

terms of section 3(2) of the Harassment Act was distinct from the

procedure prescribed under the E&D Rules and the committee to be

constituted for such purpose under the E&D Rules. In rendering its

findings, the President also relied on the law laid down by the

Supreme Court in Nadia Naz v. The President of the Islamic Republic of

Pakistan (PLD 2023 SC 588).

8. The charge sheet served on the petitioner dated 21.10.2022 noted

that WhatsApp messages sent by the petitioner to respondent No.4,

who was an Administrative Assistant serving at Pakistan's Mission in

Barcelona, constituted harassment. The petitioner's assertion that

respondent No.4 was liable for making advances on him, in view of the

fact that he took no steps to put an end to such inappropriate behavior

in his capacity as Head of Mission, constituted wrong doing. And that it

had been alleged that the petitioner sought to assault respondent No.4

in a hotel on 03.05.2022. In view of such charges, he was put on notice

to explain why he ought not be found guilty of misconduct as defined

under Rule 2(k) of the E&D Rules, why he ought not be held liable for

inefficiency in terms of rule 3(a) of the E&D Rules and not be subjected

to the penalty of dismissal from service in terms of rule 4(3)(e) of the

E&D Rules.

9. It is evident that the charges brought against the petitioner in

terms of the aforementioned charge sheet are broader than the charge

of harassment under provisions of the Harassment Act. The term harassment has been defined under section 2(h) of the Harassment Act

as follows:

harassment means:- (i) any unwelcome sexual advance, request for

sexual favours, stalking or cyber stalking or other verbal, visual

or written communication or physical conduct of a sexual

nature or sexually demeaning attitudes, including any gestures

or expression conveying derogatory connotation causing

interference with work performance or creating an

intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment, or the

attempt to punish the complainant for refusal to comply to such

a request or is made a condition for employment;

On the contrary, misconduct has been defined in terms of Rule 2(k)

of the E&D Rules as follows:

misconduct means conduct prejudicial to good order or service

discipline or contrary to Government Servants (Conduct) Rules,

1964 or unbecoming of an officer and a gentlemen and includes

any act on the part of a civil servant to assert or attempt to

assert political or other exterior influence directly or indirectly

to bear on the Government or any Government officer in respect

of any matter relating to the appointment, promotion, transfer,

punishment, retirement or other conditions of service of a civil

servant, or having entered into plea bargain under any law for

the time being in force and has returned the assets or gains

acquired through corruption or corrupt practices, voluntarily;

Penalty has been defined in terms of Rule 2(l) of the E&D Rules as

follows:

"penalty" means a penalty as prescribed under these rules.

10. The grounds prescribed in the E&D Rules for proceeding against

a civil servant are not limited to misconduct alone. Rule 3 of the E&D

Rules provides that a civil servant can be proceeded against on

grounds of inefficiency, corrupt practices, and subversive activities,

apart from the ground of being guilty of misconduct. A perusal of the

definition of misconduct together with the grounds available for

proceeding against a civil servant under the E&D Rules are much

broader than the ground of harassment on the basis of which penalties

can be imposed on an accused under provisions of the Harassment

Act. This Court further agrees with the findings of the President in the

decision dated 13.07.2023, wherein the objections to maintainability of

a complaint under the Harassment Act (while proceedings against the

same accused under the E&D Rules were continuing) were dismissed.

11. The E&D Rules have been enacted in exercise of delegated

authority under section 25 of the Civil Servants Act, 1973, pursuant to

which, inter alia, the terms and conditions of persons in the service of

Pakistan have been prescribed. Proceedings initiated under provisions

of the E&D Rules are a matter between the Federal Government in its capacity as an employer and a civil servant in his/her capacity as an

employee. The purpose of such proceedings is to ensure that an

employee is abiding by the terms and conditions of service prescribed

for purposes of his/her conduct in discharge of his/her duties. The

object and scope of the Harassment Act is altogether different as the

rationale for enactment of such law, as explained in its preamble, is to

provide for protection of women from harassment at the workplace. A

set of facts on the basis of which a complaint is founded against an

accused under provisions of the Harassment Act needs to be inquired

into under provisions of the said Act, which, if proved, the

consequences and penalties prescribed under the Harassment Act are

to flow toward the accused.

12. The proceedings under the Harassment Act are adversarial in

nature, where a complainant makes allegations against an accused

and the same have to be proved on the basis of cogent evidence. That

the penalties prescribed in terms of section 4 of the Harassment Act

may be similar to, or overlap with, the penalties prescribed in terms of

Rule 4 of the E&D Rules has no bearing on the object, purpose and

effect of the proceedings under the Harassment Act on one hand and

E&D Rules on the other. The proceedings under the Harassment Act

are initiated on the behest of a complainant who has been wronged by

the actions of an accused. The penalties prescribed under section 4 of

the Harassment Act, including the penalty of fine payable by an

accused to the complainant, can be seen as a restitutionary measure

apart from acting as a deterrent. The proceedings under the E&D Rules

being disciplinary proceedings initiated by an employer are of a

different nature altogether. These proceedings may be triggered by the

complaint filed by another employee, who also has an independent

cause of action under provisions of the Harassment Act or other laws

for the time being in force. But such complainant does not have an

independent right to require the initiation of proceedings against the

accused under provisions of the E&D Rules. The proceedings under the

E&D Rules are not necessarily adversarial in nature and are meant to

confirm and ensure that the terms and conditions of service

prescribed for purposes of the Civil Servants Act, including the

requirements as to the conduct and efficiency of an employee, are

being complied with. As explained above, the fact that the penalties

prescribed under the E&D Rules may overlap with some of the

penalties prescribed under the Harassment Act does not mean that the

cause of action, the procedure for inquiry and consequential action,

and the consequences of a finding of wrong doing under both laws are

the same.

13. The basic assertion of the learned counsel for the petitioner was

that simultaneous proceedings under provisions of the Harassment Act

and E&D Rules undermine the guarantee afforded by Article 13(a) of

the Constitution, which provides that, no person shall be prosecuted or

punished for the same offence more than once. The first thing to note

here is that the protection afforded by Article 13(a) relates to

prosecution and/or punishment for offences and therefore falls within the domain of criminal law. The matter before us involves civil

proceedings under the Harassment Act on the one hand and

disciplinary proceedings under E&D Rules on the other. Article 13(a)

therefore has no application in the facts of the present case.

14. The question of whether or not proceedings in relation to a

criminal charge could continue alongside departmental proceedings in

a service matter came before the Supreme Court in DIG of Police v.

Anees ur Rehman Khan (PLD 1985 Supreme Court 134), in which it was

held that, the scope and the law applicable to the criminal trial was

different from that applicable to departmental inquiry. The charges in

the two were not identical nor substantially the same. The competent

authority was not therefore duty-bound under any provision or

principle of law to await and follow the judicial verdict in the case.

The question was again considered in Syed Muhammad Iqbal Jafri v.

Registrar, Lahore High Court (2004 PLC (C.S.) 809) in which the

Supreme Court held that, there is no bar to proceed departmentally

against any civil servant as departmental disciplinary proceedings are

entirely different from that of the criminal proceedings on criminal

charges and are neither coextensive nor inter-connected. Judicial trial

is not a substitute for the departmental inquiry as it relates to the

enforcement of criminal liability, whereas the departmental

proceedings are concerned with the service, discipline and good order.

15. In the matter of Falak Sher v. Inspector General of Police (2005

SCMR 1020), an employee of the police had been given the penalty of

compulsory retirement. The said employee was subsequently

acquitted in a criminal case emerging from the same facts on the basis

of which disciplinary proceedings were initiated. The Supreme Court

dismissed the contention that, in view of the acquittal of the petitioner,

he could not have been awarded any penalty as a result of disciplinary

action. It was held in Dr. Suhail Hassan Khan v. Director General

(Research), Livestock and Dairy Development Department (2020 SCMR

1708) that, it is by now well settled that a civil servant cannot escape

departmental proceedings or consequences thereof on account of his

acquittal/exoneration on a criminal charge arising out of the same

impugned transaction; these two are entirely different jurisdictions

with different standards of proof as well as procedures; criminal

prosecution requires strict proof through a narrowly jacketed

procedure and, thus, State s failure on criminal plane does not provide

shield of double jeopardy to a delinquent officer.

16. The principle laid down in Dr. Suhail Hassan Khan was

reiterated in Faraz Naveed v. District Police Officer, Gujarat (2022

SCMR 1770). It was held by the Supreme Court that, the rationale and

astuteness of initiating disciplinary proceedings by the employer is to

unmask whether the charges of misconduct levelled against the

delinquent are proved or not and in case his guilt is proved, what

action should be triggered against him under the applicable service

laws, rules and regulations, which may include the imposition of

minor or major penalties in accordance with the fine sense of  judgment of the competent authority It is well settled exposition of law

that the prosecution in the criminal cases as well as the departmental

inquiry on the same allegations can be conducted and continued

concurrently at both venues without having any overriding or

overlapping effect. The object of criminal trial is to mete out

punishment of the offenses committed by the accused while

departmental inquiry is inaugurated to inquire into the allegations of

misconduct in order to keep up and maintain the discipline and

decorum in the institution and efficiency of department to strengthen

and preserve public confidence.

17. In the matter of Saifur Rahman v. Chairman, National

Accountability Bureau (PLD 2022 SC 409), it was asserted before the

Supreme Court that simultaneous proceedings under provisions of the

Companies Act, 1984, and provisions of the National Accountability

Bureau Ordinance, 1999, fall foul of the guarantee in Article 13(a) of

the Constitution. The Supreme Court was not impressed and held that,

the expressions prosecuted and same offence used in Article 13 are of

vital significance in determining the scope of the protection

guaranteed. The expression prosecuted means prosecuted on a charge

of criminal nature before a court of law; it does not include

prosecution on the basis of breach of some code of conduct by a

disciplinary authority or breach of some regulatory framework by an

administrative authority. The expression same offence means offence

constituted of the same ingredients and does not mean same matter or

same facts . The ingredients of the offence earlier charged and the

offence subsequently charged should be the same, to attract the bar of

Article 13, in the sense that the facts constituting the offence earlier

charged were also sufficient to justify the conviction of the offence

subsequently charged.

18. The interpretation of Article 13 came before the Supreme Court

in the matter of Muhammad Ashraf v. The State (1995 SCMR 626). It

was held by the Supreme Court that, the rule that no one shall be

vexed twice for the same offence has its roots in the ancient maxim

"Nemo bis debet puniri pro uno delicto" which means that no one

should be subjected to peril twice for the same offence. It is a

fundamental rule of Criminal Law that no one should be exposed to

hazards of punishment and convicted twice for one and the same

offence Constitutional guarantee is available only if the accused is

convicted and punished. Thus if the first prosecution results in

acquittal, so far as this Article is concerned, the second prosecution is

not prohibited.

19. The scope of the protection afforded under Article 13(a) came

before the Supreme Court in The State v. Jehangir Akhtar (2018 SCMR

733) in which it was held that, disciplinary action taken by a

department and criminal prosecution are quite distinct from each

other and can proceed simultaneously or one after the other and such

separate actions do not attract the principle of double jeopardy. It has

already been clarified by this Court in many a precedent case that disciplinary proceedings are meant solely for maintaining and

ensuring purity of service, whereas criminal prosecution is meant to

punish a person for the offence committed by him and that in a proper

case, departmental and criminal proceedings can proceed

simultaneously or one after the other.

20. Most relevant for our present purposes is the law as clarified by

the Supreme Court in Raja Tanveer Safdar v. Mrs. Tahmina Yasmeen

(PLD 2024 SC 795). The question before the Supreme Court was

whether a person could be proceeded against and punished under

provisions of the Defamation Ordinance, 2002, the Harassment Act and

the Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act,

2006 ( PEEDA Act ). The Supreme Court reiterated the enumeration of

principles of double jeopardy in Muhammad Ashraf. It then took into

account the fact that three different decisions had been rendered

against the petitioner in terms of three separate laws. The Supreme

Court held that, each of these laws [Defamation Ordinance,

Harassment Act and PEEDA Act] are special laws which operate under

their given jurisdiction and can result in penal consequences if the

requirement of the law are fulfilled. It was held that, in terms of the

2010 Act [Harassment Act] harassment means gender-based

harassment and discrimination, which can be sexual in nature. Any

action that causes interference with performance or creating an

intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment falls within the

definition of harassment under section 2(h) of the 2010 Act. The said

Act operates for a very specific purpose, which is to determine

whether there has been any harassment at the workplace by an

employer against an employee. It was held that, as far as PEEDA Act is

concerned, it is for misconduct by levelling false and fabricated

allegations against respondent No.1, which is a separate and distinct

cause of action against the petitioner. Hence, a conviction under any of

these laws will not prevent or bar a conviction under the other two

laws, which operate within their own domain for a specific purpose.

The Supreme Court explained that, even though the parties are the

same, the cause of action is separate in each case before different

forums with distinct penal consequences emanating out of its

respective statutory laws.

21. In view of the aforesaid law as applicable to facts of this case,

the petitioner s argument of being subjected to double jeopardy is

misplaced and devoid of legal basis. The ratio of Raja Tanveer Safdar is

squarely applicable to the case at hand. While respondent No.4 was a

complainant in relation to the complaint filed under the Harassment

Act, as well as for purposes of initiation of proceedings under the E&D

Rules, the cause of action for purposes of both proceedings was

distinct, the procedure to be adopted for purposes of both proceedings

did not require to be correlated, and the consequences that may flow

to the petitioner in case the charge against him in each of the two sets of proceedings is made out, in view of the applicable standard of

proof, would be independent of each other.

22. This Court therefore finds that the principle of double jeopardy

does not apply in the instant matter and neither can any principle of

equity and fairness be relied upon by the petitioner to argue that

proceedings against the petitioner under the Harassment Act and the

E&D Rules could not proceed simultaneously. Further, as was held by

the Supreme Court in Dr. Suhail Hassan Khan and reiterated in Faraz

Naveed, the petitioner cannot escape departmental proceedings or

consequences thereof on account of his exoneration on a harassment

charge that has been adjudicated under provisions of the Harassment

Act.

23. While this Court has heard and decided the question of law that

arose in the instant matter while treating it as a case of first

impression involving simultaneous proceedings under provisions of

the Harassment Act and the E&D Rules, especially as the judgment of

the Supreme Court in Raja Tanveer Safdar that provides guidance in

the matter was rendered after the instant petition was admitted for

hearing, this Court has also come to the conclusion that the petition

impugning a SCN issued under provisions of the E&D Rules was also

not maintainable in terms of Article 212 of the Constitution. In view of

the law laid down by the Supreme Court in I.A. Sherwani v.

Government of Pakistan (1991 SCMR 1041), Pir Muhammad v.

Government of Balochistan (2007 SCMR 54) and Muhammad Hassan

Ullah v. Chief Secretary Government of Balochistan (2025 SCMR 134), it

is now settled that even where a challenge is brought against an action

that falls within the scope of terms and condition of service of a civil

servant on the basis that such action is in breach of fundamental

rights of the civil servant, the same ought to be agitated before the

Federal Services Tribunal and not before the High Court in its

constitutional jurisdiction.

24. For the aforementioned reasons, this Court finds that the

petition is devoid of merit apart from not being maintainable and is

therefore dismissed subject to a cost of Rs.50,000/- payable by the

petitioner to respondent No.1 within a period of thirty (30) days.

Learned counsel for the petitioner will file a certificate stating the

order granting cost has been complied with by or before the expiry of

the (30) days period.

MH/205/Isl. Petition dismissed.