2026 S C M R 807

 2026 S C M R 807

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Syed Mansoor Ali shah and Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi, JJ

The SECRETARY/CHAIRMAN RAILWAYS, GOVERNMENT OF

PAKISTAN, MINISTRY OF RAILWAYS, ISLAMABAD and others ---

Petitioners

Versus

TARIQ MANSOOR and others ---Respondents

Civil Petitions Nos. 3651-L and 4648 of 2022, decided on 30th October,

2025.

(Against the judgment dated 26.10.2022 of the Federal Service

Tribunal, Lahore in Appeal No. 300(L) of 2020).

(a) Employment---

----Advance increments on higher qualification---Entitlement---

Determination---Applicability of incentive schemes ---Audit

department officer holding LLB---Eligibility---Briefly, respondent was

serving as an accounts officer in the audit department of Pakistan

Railways---He acquired an LLB degree in 1992 and thereafter sought

grant of two advance increments under the incentive scheme for

railways officers and subordinates, 1966, and the general scheme for

grant of advance increments, 1996 ---Respondent s representation was

rejected by the finance department on the ground that the 1966

Scheme had been abolished and that his qualification did not fall

within the 1996 Scheme, whereupon the Federal Service Tribunal

allowed his claim under the 1966 Scheme---The issue requiring

determination before the Supreme Court was whether the accounts

officer of the audit department holding an LLB degree was legally

entitled to advance increments under either of the aforesaid schemes ?

---Held: No benefit under the Scheme, 1966 had been extended to

officers of the audit department, and an LLB qualification was not

recognized under the General Scheme, 1996, therefore, the respondent

s case did not fall within the scope of either scheme---The benefit

extended by the Service Tribunal under the Scheme, 1966 was thus

unsustainable---Moreover, an LLB degree was not equivalent to a

master s degree---Respondent was not entitled to advance increments

under either of the schemes---Petitions were converted into appeals

and allowed, in circumstances.

Government through Secretary Finance, Finance Division

(Regulation Wing), Islamabad v. Manzoor Qadir, Assistant Director

(Mails) and others C.P.L.A. No. 262 of 2018 and The Secretary Finance

Division, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad v. Hakim Ali Soomro and

others C.P.L.A. No. 65 of 2017 rel.

(b) Constitution of Pakistan Arts.37(d) & 212(3)---Employment cases---Remanding of cases---

Supreme Court s view viz remanding the matters on issues not

addressed by lower forums--- Remand is not an automatic judicial

reflex, it is a judicial instrument to be employed only when justice so

demands, not as a matter of routine---A case may properly be

remanded to a lower forum where material facts remain

undetermined, procedural fairness has been compromised, or

essential evidence has not been duly examined, situations in which the

Appellate Court cannot itself do complete justice---The purpose of

remand is corrective, not dilatory; it serves to secure a just

adjudication, not to prolong litigation---Yet, the power to remand must

be exercised with circumspection and restraint---Where the factual

matrix is complete, the issues are purely legal, or the appellate record

permits a final determination, the Appellate Court ought to decide the

matter itself---To remand in such circumstances is to sacrifice

substance at the altar of form and to delay justice in the name of

process---The restraint against unnecessary remand finds its rationale

in the principle of judicial economy, a foundational tenet of modern

adjudication that obliges courts to avoid duplication of proceedings,

promote finality, and conserve judicial time---It embodies the

constitutional command for expeditious justice under Article 37(d) of

the Constitution, ensuring that litigation does not get trapped in

repetitive procedural rounds---Judicial economy thus demands that

appellate courts decide, not defer, where the record enables them to

do so, for justice delayed is justice denied.

(c) Employment---

----Matters of policy discretion or administrative choice of executive

authority---Judicial restraint---Institutional autonomy---Principle---

Courts, while the ultimate interpreters of legality, must exercise

judicial restraint in matters where the law vests policy discretion or

administrative choice in an executive or institutional authority---The

principle of institutional autonomy thus guards against judicial

overreach, ensuring that policy formation remains the prerogative of

the executive, and that courts confine themselves to ensuring legality,

rationality, and procedural fairness within the limits set by law.

For Petitioners:

Jawad Mahmood Pasha, Advocate Supreme Court (via video link

from Branch Registry Lahore), Barrister Umer Aslam, A.A.G. Pakistan

along with Shoaib Adil, Additional Secretary, Pakistan Railway,

Muhammad Tayyab, Director Pakistan Railway, Ms. Huma Noureen,

Legal Consultant, Pakistan Railway, Najam Bashir, CFO, Pakistan

Railway and Khalid Zia, SO (Litigation).

For Respondents:

Sheikh Muhammad Ali, Advocate Supreme Court and Behzad Mund,

Advocate High Court. Date of hearing: 30th October, 2025.

ORDER

SYED MANSOOR ALI SHAH, J.---Brief facts of the case are that the

respondent, serving as Accounts Officer in the Audit Department of

Pakistan Railways, enhanced his qualification by obtaining an LLB

degree in the year 1992. Consequently, he applied for two advance

increments under two schemes: (i) THE INCENTIVE SCHEME FOR

RAILWAYS OFFICERS AND SUBORDINATES dated 22.01.1966 ( Scheme,

1966 ) issued by the Railway Department, Government of West

Pakistan; and (ii) GRANT OF ADVANCE INCREMENTS TO THE

EMPLOYEES DRAWING PAY IN BPS-16 Office Memorandum dated

08.07.1996 ( General Scheme, 1996 ). The respondent approached the

department through a representation, which was referred to the

Finance Department and subsequently rejected vide order dated

26.09.2019 on the ground that the Scheme, 1966 stood abolished on

01.12.2001. The respondent challenged the said decision before the

Tribunal, which, vide impugned judgment dated 26.10.2022, granted

him relief under the Scheme, 1966.

2. Learned Additional Attorney General for Pakistan, representing

Pakistan Railways and the Federal Government, assisted by Mr. Jawad

Mahmood Pasha, ASC, and Ms. Huma Noureen, Legal Consultant,

Pakistan Railways, submits that the respondent, being an Accounts

Officer in the Audit Department, was not entitled to any incentive

under the Scheme, 1966. Learned Law Officer referred to the scheme

to show that while it extends benefits to various departments of

Pakistan Railways, the Audit Department is not one of them. With

regard to the General Scheme, 1996, it was submitted that the said

scheme requires a person to possess an M.A. or M.Sc. degree to qualify

for two advance increments. As the respondent s qualification is LLB,

he does not fall within its ambit.

3. Conversely, learned counsel for the respondent vehemently

argued that several judgments of the Tribunal, as well as letters issued

by Pakistan Railways and the Finance Division, have extended similar

benefits to officers who obtained an LLB degree. Some of these

references, however, relate to departments already covered under the

Scheme, 1966, and none pertains to an Accounts Officer of the Audit

Department.

4. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and examined

the record. Upon careful perusal of both schemes, we find that no

benefit under the Scheme, 1966 has been extended to officers of the

Audit Department, and that an LLB qualification is not recognized

under the General Scheme, 1996. Therefore, the respondent s case does

not fall within the scope of either scheme. The benefit extended by the

Tribunal under the Scheme, 1966 is thus unsustainable and stands set

aside.

5. As to the respondent s alternate plea under the General Scheme,

1996, the Tribunal did not address it. We considered the option of remanding the matter to the Tribunal for this purpose. However, since

the record before us is complete and enables us to finally determine

the issue, there is no occasion to remand the case.

6. We wish to highlight that Remand is not an automatic judicial

reflex. It is a judicial instrument to be employed only when justice so

demands, not as a matter of routine. A case may properly be remanded

to a lower forum where material facts remain undetermined,

procedural fairness has been compromised, or essential evidence has

not been duly examined situations in which the appellate court cannot

itself do complete justice. The purpose of remand is corrective, not

dilatory; it serves to secure a just adjudication, not to prolong

litigation.

7. Yet, the power to remand must be exercised with circumspection

and restraint. Where the factual matrix is complete, the issues are

purely legal, or the appellate record permits a final determination, the

appellate court ought to decide the matter itself. To remand in such

circumstances is to sacrifice substance at the altar of form and to delay

justice in the name of process. The restraint against unnecessary

remand finds its rationale in the principle of judicial economy a

foundational tenet of modern adjudication that obliges courts to avoid

duplication of proceedings, promote finality, and conserve judicial

time. It embodies the constitutional command for expeditious justice

under Article 37(d) of the Constitution, ensuring that litigation does

not get trapped in repetitive procedural rounds. Judicial economy thus

demands that appellate courts decide, not defer, where the record

enables them to do so, for justice delayed is justice denied.

8. It was next argued by learned counsel for the respondent that an

LLB degree is equivalent to an M.A. degree, hence the respondent is

entitled to benefit under the General Scheme, 1996. No such facility for

treating equivalent degrees is provided in the scheme, nor can such a

condition be judicially read into it. Institutional autonomy is a vital

facet of constitutional governance. It reflects the recognition that each

organ or department of the State possesses its own sphere of

competence, expertise, and discretion within which it must be

permitted to function freely. Courts, while the ultimate interpreters of

legality, must exercise judicial restraint in matters where the law vests

policy discretion or administrative choice in an executive or

institutional authority.

9. When a scheme or departmental policy such as one framed by

Pakistan Railways or the Finance Division does not expressly provide

for a particular benefit, it is not the function of the Court to read that

benefit into the scheme. Doing so would amount to judicial legislation

and would erode the institutional autonomy that underpins

administrative efficacy. Courts are to interpret the scheme as framed,

not to re-engineer it according to perceived notions of equity or

convenience.

10. The judiciary must therefore respect the institutional boundaries

drawn by law. Unless the omission complained of violates a constitutional or statutory command, the Court cannot compel an

institution to adopt a policy or grant a concession not contemplated by

its own governing framework. The principle of institutional autonomy

thus guards against judicial overreach, ensuring that policy formation

remains the prerogative of the executive, and that courts confine

themselves to ensuring legality, rationality, and procedural fairness

within the limits set by law.

11. Furthermore, this Court has already held that an LLB degree is

not equivalent to a Master s degree. Reference may be made to order

dated 17.02.2022 passed in CPLA No. 262 of 2018 titled Government

through Secretary Finance, Finance Division (Regulation Wing),

Islamabad v. Manzoor Qadir, Assistant Director (Mails) and others, and

order dated 13.03.2018 passed in CPLA No. 65 of 2017 titled The

Secretary Finance Division, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad v.

Hakim Ali Soomro and others.

12. Accordingly, we see no reason to remand the matter to the

Tribunal and hold that the respondent is not entitled to advance

increments under either of the Schemes. We note that, following the

impugned judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, the respondent

has already received advance increments amounting to Rs. 75,000/-.

The Additional Secretary, Pakistan Railways, submits that, in the facts

and circumstances of this case, the Department does not intend to

recover the said amount from the respondent. The Department has

shown grace and magnanimity in foregoing this amount; however, this

arrangement shall not be treated or cited as a precedent in any other

case. The instant petitions are converted into appeals and allowed.

UN/S-55/SC Appeals allowed.