2026 C L C 377

 2026 C L C 377

[Sindh]

Before Muhammad Iqbal Kalhoro and Mohammad Abdur Rahman,

JJ

Messrs VISIONARY BALUCHISTAN MEDIA CORPORATION ---

Appellant

Versus

Mst. SHAHNAZ ABID and 2 others ---Respondents

High Court Appeal No. 374 and C.M.A. No. 3663 of 2022, decided on 7th

October, 2025.

(a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---

----Ss.12 & 22---Contract Act (IX of 1872), S.55---Limitation Act (IX of

1908), First Sched., Art.113---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.VII,

R.11---Suit for specific performance of agreement to sell filed after a

seven years delay---Time being essence of contract---Principle---

Discretionary relief, granting of---Scope---Failure to deposit balance

sale consideration at institution of suit---Impact on entitlement to

relief stated---Brief facts were that the appellant (vendee) and

respondent (vendor) entered into a sale agreement regarding suit

property, under which only Rs.14,00,000/- of the agreed Rs.19 million

sale consideration was paid, and the balance was required to be

cleared under a compromise order stipulating payment by

07.07.2013---The appellant neither complied with the compromise

terms nor made any further payment, and after several years filed

suit for specific performance, which was rejected under O.VII R.11,

C.P.C. as barred by limitation---The issue before the High Court was

whether the appellant s suit for specific performance which was

filed years after the agreed timelines and without payment of the

remaining consideration, was maintainable in law and within

limitation, so as to justify interference with the rejection of plaint

and denial of discretionary relief? ---Held: Nothing by the appellant

was articulated to explain such inordinate delay, let alone making

efforts to make payment of remaining sale consideration in time---

Single Judge had taken into account the fact that the contract

between the parties was more than a decade old and worth of the

subject property had meanwhile increased manifold; hence, such

development i.e. property getting hugely costly was sufficient to

deny the discretionary relief to the appellant---On the point of

limitation, it had been held by the Single Judge that the sale

agreement was executed on 19.04.2012 and the plaint was presented on 09.11.2019 after seven years, whereas, under Art.113 of the

Limitation Act, appellant had only three years to file suit for seeking

enforcement of the contract from the date of refusal---Not only the

suit was barred by time but because of failure of the appellant to

adhere to the terms and conditions mentioned in the compromise

order he had made himself disentitled to seek discretionary relief of

specific performance by the respondent---Further, due to failure of

appellant to deposit the remaining sale consideration in the Court at

the time of instituting the suit, the case of the appellant seeking

relief of specific performance got on weaker footings from the very

inception---In the present case, relevant material showing genuine

efforts of the appellant to adhere to his part of the agreement was

lacking---Further, no justification had been articulated to warrant in

action of the appellant to file the suit within time firstly, and

secondly his failure to deposit the remaining sale consideration

within time in the Court even---The plaint had been rightly rejected

under O.VII, R.11 of C.P.C.---No illegality or error in the impugned

order to justify its reversal was found---Present appeal was without

any merit and was dismissed.

(b) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---

----Ss.12 & 22---Contract Act (IX of 1872), S.55---Time being essence of

contract---Principle---Scope---When the time is essence of the

agreement, its violation will render the defaulting party disentitled

to Court s interference in the shape of discretionary relief.

(c) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---

----Ss.12 & 22---Specific performance of agreement to sell---

Discretionary relief, grant of---Scope---The discretionary relief can

be extended to a person whose actions are anchored in bona fide

while pursuing a contract, and he is seen to be making genuine

efforts to perform his part of the agreement---Anyone whose action

speaks otherwise will not be held entitled to such a relief.

Anwar Hussain for Appellant.

Khalil Ahmed for Respondent No. 1.

Date of hearing: 7th October, 2025.

JUDGMENT

MUHAMMAD IQBAL KALHORO, J.---This appeal is filed against an

order dated 06.09.2022 rejecting the plaint under Order VII Rule 11,

C.P.C. and decree dated 19.09.2022 in Suit No.852/2021. 2. Record reflects that appellant filed the aforesaid suit, whereas,

respondent No. 1 filed Suit No.1228/2017. It was stated, a sale

agreement was executed on 19.04.2012 between the parties in respect

of property i.e. Plot No.5-F, admeasuring 400 square yards, situated at

Block-6, PECHS, Karachi. The said sale agreement gave way to

compromise between the parties in Suit No.1701/2009, decided

through an order dated 07.11.2012 stipulating that entire balance sale

consideration should be paid to respondent No. 1 on or before

07.07.2013.

3. The record further reflects that in terms of the sale agreement,

the sale consideration of the property was fixed as Rs.19 Million

(Rupees Nineteen Million), out of which, only Rs.14,00,000/- were paid

to the vendor/defendant/respondent No. 1 by appellant. In the

agreement, the sale consideration was stipulated to be paid before a

certain time but the appellant failed to adhere to the conditions and

defaulted. The ground to justify the default by the appellant was that

respondent No. 1 had no clear title over the property and that the

remaining payment was subject to the clearance of title. When the

compromise in Suit No.1701/2009 could not be given effect to by the

parties, the appellant filed Suit No.852/2021 for specific performance

of contract. This suit was resisted by respondent No.1 on various

grounds and in addition an application under Order VII Rule 11, C.P.C.

was filed for rejection of the plaint, which through the impugned

order has been allowed. The plaint in Suit No.852/2021 has been

rejected, whereas, Suit No.1228/2017 in view of such fact has been

dismissed as withdrawn.

4. We have heard the parties. Learned counsel for appellant has

admitted that the only payment made by appellant towards the sale

consideration amounting to Rs.14,00,000/- was made in the year 2012

in terms of agreement dated 19.04.2012. Thereafter, not a single penny

towards sale consideration has been paid by the appellant despite

filing of the suit for specific performance of contract. It is not even

disputed that meanwhile the price of the subject property has

increased manifold. It is not disputed either that the relief of specific

performance is discretionary which the Court can deny even in

presence of positive evidence in favour of vendee, when the Court is

satisfied that such relief is not equitable.

5. Learned single Judge has observed in clear terms in the impugned

order that the order passed in earlier suit (Suit No.1701/2009)

stipulating compromise between the parties and payment of

remaining sale consideration on or before 07.07.2013 had not been

complied with even partly by the appellant. Nothing by the appellant

has been articulated to even explain such inordinate delay, let alone making efforts to make payment of remaining sale consideration in

time. It has also been held by learned single Judge that proviso in the

contract stipulating fixed time for making payment of remaining sale

consideration has made the time essence of the agreement. When the

time is essence of the agreement, its violation will render the

defaulting party disentitled to Court s interference in the shape of

discretionary relief.

6. The impugned order further shows that against the appellant rent

proceedings were initiated by the respondent earlier, in which, the

tentative rent order was passed and appellant was directed to make

good of certain amount towards the rent but he failed to comply with

the same even though ultimately he was directed to do so by the

Supreme Court. While noting such facts, the learned single Judge has

also taken into account the fact that the contract between the parties

was more than a decade old and worth of the subject property has

meanwhile increased manifold; hence, in his view, even such

development i.e. property getting hugely costly was sufficient to deny

the discretionary relief to the appellant.

7. On the point of limitation, it has been held by learned single Judge

that the sale agreement was executed on 19.04.2012 and the plaint was

presented on 09.11.2019 after seven years, whereas, under Article 113

of the Limitation Act, appellant had only three years to file suit for

seeking enforcement of the contract from the date of refusal. The

earlier contract dated 19.04.2012 was novated by the order dated

07.11.2012 disposing of the Suit No.1701/2009 on the basis of

compromise, in which, appellant was directed to make good of the

remaining sale consideration before a certain date (07.07.2013), but

even that appellant failed to comply with.

8. In consideration of all these relevant facts, the learned single

Judge has held that the suit of the appellant is hit by Article 113 of the

Limitation Act and is apparently barred by time. In lengthy arguments

rendered by learned counsel for appellant, he has been unable to

present any material scuttling the findings made by learned single

Judge in the impugned order. Not only the suit was barred by time but

because of failure of the appellant to adhere to the terms and

conditions mentioned in the order dated 07.11.2012, he has made

himself disentitled to discretionary relief of specific performance by

the respondent.

9. Further, due to failure of appellant to deposit the remaining sale

consideration in the Court at the time of instituting the suit, the case of

the appellant seeking relief of specific performance got on weaker

footings from the very inception. The discretionary relief can be

extended to a person whose actions are anchored in bona fide while pursuing a contract, and he is seen to be making genuine efforts to

perform his part of the agreement. Anyone whose action speaks

otherwise will not be held entitled to such a relief. In the present case,

relevant material showing genuine efforts of the appellant to adhere

to his part of the agreement is lacking. Further, before us no

justification has been articulated to warrant inaction of the appellant

to file the suit within time firstly, and secondly his failure to deposit

the remaining sale consideration within time in the Court even. The

plaint has been rightly rejected under Order VII Rule 11, C.P.C.; hence,

we do not find any illegality or error in the impugned order to justify

its reversal in this appeal. Consequently, we find this appeal to be

without any merit, and accordingly dismiss it along with pending

application.

The appeal is disposed of.

UN/V-1/Sindh Appeal dismissed.