2026 P Cr. L J 668

 2026 P Cr. L J 668

[Lahore (Bahawalpur Bench)]

Before Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan, J

MUSHTAQ AHMED---Petitioner

Versus

The STATE and others---Respondents

Criminal Appeal No. 481 of 2022, decided on 15th September, 2025.

Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----S. 462-E---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 417(2-A)---

Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Ss. 3 & 5 & First Sched., Art. 157--- Gas

theft---Acquittal of the accused---Appeal against acquittal, filing of---

Limitation---Condonation of delay---Scope---Appeal against acquittal

barred by 27 days---Held: Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 and the

Civil Procedure Code, 1908, were to be treated as special law and not

general law, for the purpose of Limitation Act, 1908---Provisions

contained in Ss.4, 9 to 18 and 22 of the Limitation Act, 1908, as

prescribed by clause (a) of subsection (2) of S.29 of the Limitation

Act, 1908, shall apply to special law, however, S.5 of the Limitation

Act, 1908, for not finding mention in S.29 ibid. shall not be

applicable in that regard, as clause (b) of subsection (2) of S.29 of the

Limitation Act, 1908, provides that all the remaining provisions of

that Act shall not apply---Subsection (2-A) of S.417, Cr.P.C ordains

that "A person aggrieved by the order of acquittal passed by any

Court other than a High Court may, within thirty days file an appeal

against such order"---Said period of thirty days, would run from the

date of passing of the order of acquittal and not from the date of

knowledge---Therefore, the contention of the appellant that the

instant appeal had been filed within the prescribed period of

limitation reckoned from the date of knowledge, i.e. 11.03.2022, was

not tenable---For the other contention of the appellant that Sui

Northern Gas Pipelines Limited was a government department, it

might be observed that Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited (SNGPL)

was incorporated as a private limited company and then converted

into a public limited company under the Companies Act, 2017---

Persons forming a private company were the "legal persons" who

had established the legal entities through a law, such as public

companies, private companies, limited liability partnerships,

associations etc., registered under the Companies Act, 2017---Thus, it

could safely be inferred that "a company" was "a person" created by

law, which could sue and be sued except that it could not be jailed

or hanged, so it came within the meaning of "A person" as given in subsection (2-A) of S.417, Cr.P.C.---Therefore, due to the bar

contained in clauses (a) & (b) of subsection (2) of S.29 of the

Limitation Act, 1908 and there being the special limitation of thirty

days prescribed by the said statue, the provisions of S.5 and Art.157

of the Limitation Act, 1908, had lost their applicability or relevancy

over the matter in hand---Lapse of time in a criminal matter is

sufficient to provide protection to a person, who has been acquitted,

against further judicial process by way of filing of an appeal against

his acquittal---Thus, the provision of condonation of delay under S.5

and Art.157 of the Limitation Act, 1908 is not available for filing of

an appeal against acquittal---Hence, petition for condonation of

delay was rejected and the instant appeal was dismissed being

barred by time.

Muhammad Sami v. Additional District Judge, Sargodha and 2 others

2007 SCMR 621; Hakim Muhammad Buta and another v. Habib Ahmad

and others PLD 1985 SC 153; Hafeez Ahmad and others v. Civil Judge,

Lahore and others PLD 2012 SC 400; Fakhar-ud-Din v. Fazal Karim and

others 1999 SCMR 795; Piran Ditta v. The State 1970 SCMR 282 and Mst.

Zeenat Sultan v. Mumtaz Khan and others PLD 1994 SC 667 rel.

Shoaib Iqbal for Appellant.

Shahid Farid, Assistant District Public Prosecutor for the State.

Muhammad Munir Gondal for Respondent No. 2.

ORDER

RAJA GHAZANFAR ALI KHAN, J.---By way of filing of the instant

appeal in terms of Section 417 (2-A) Cr.P.C, the appellant has

challenged the judgment dated 25.01.2022 passed by the learned

Additional Sessions Judge, Liaquatpur, whereby while exercising the

powers conferred under Section 265-K Cr.P.C the learned trial Court

has acquitted the accused/respondent No.2 of the charge in case FIR

No.513/2020 dated 26.08.2020, offence under Section 462-E P.P.C, Police

Station Shedani Sharif District Rahim Yar Khan.

2. Initially, the office has raised objection to the registration of the

instant appeal on the ground that the same is barred by 27 days and

better copy of Page-11 should be annexed with the file. However, the

matter was placed before the Court as an objection case and vide order

dated 12.09.2022 the office objections were sustained with a direction

to remove the same within seven days and in compliance of the said

order, the application (Crl. Misc. No.2/2022) under Section 5 of the

Limitation Act, 1908 for condonation of delay in filing of the appeal

was filed by the appellant on 19.09.2022. Vide order dated 22.02.2024,

the instant appeal was admitted for regular hearing and notice was issued to respondent No.2. However, on 21.10.2024 the following order

was passed by this Court:-

The learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No.2

submits that initially when the instant appeal was filed, an

objection was raised to the registration of the said appeal by the

Office and the said objection was sustained by the Court,

however, without adverting to this question of law, the appeal

was admitted for regular hearing vide order dated 22.02.2024,

passed by this Court and submits that the question as to whether

after the sustaining of the objection raised with regard to the

maintainability of the appeal, as being barred by time, the said

appeal could have been admitted for regular hearing, needs to

be addressed in the first instance. The contention of the learned

counsel for the respondent No.2 is tenable, therefore, the

learned counsel for the appellant is directed to assist the Court

with respect to the contention of the learned counsel for the

appellant.

3. It is well settled by now that any order or judgment passed by the

Trial, Appellant or Revisional Court should be indicative of the fact

that the Court concerned was not only aware but also conscious

regarding the question of limitation, which is to be dealt with

diligently by applying the proper judicious mind prior to dilating upon

and deciding the controversy on merits, and disposal on merits alone

would not be sufficient to presume that the delay has been condoned.

In this context, reliance is placed on the judgment reported as

Muhammad Sami v. Additional District Judge, Sargodha and 2 others

(2007 SCMR 621), wherein the Hon ble Supreme Court of Pakistan has

held as under:-

It is worth mentioning that the question of limitation was neither

dilated upon nor decided by the learned High Court. In our

considered view the question of limitation should have not been

left unattended to having a substantial bearing on the fate of the

case. It is bounden duty of the Court to notice the question of

limitation irrespective of the fact whether it was agitated or not.

In this regard we are fortified by the dictum laid down in case

titled Muhammad Buta v. Habib Ahmad PLD 1985 SC 153. There

is no cavil with the proposition that any order or judgment

passed by trial, appellate or revisional Courts should be

indicative of the fact that the Courts concerned were not only

aware but conscious regarding the question of limitation dealt

with the same with diligent application of mind prior to, dilating

upon and deciding the controversy on merit because disposal on

merit alone would not be sufficient to presume that the delay was condoned. In this regard reference can be made to case

titled Ahsan Ali v. District Judge PLD 1969 SC 167, which still

holds the field and relevant portion whereof is reproduced

herein below for ready reference:

It has also been held by this Court in several cases that mere

disposal of the appeal on merits is not sufficient to lead to the

inference that the delay must have been condoned. There must

be something in the order or judgment itself to show that the

Court concerned was conscious of the fact that the proceeding

was out of time and had applied its mind to the question of

limitation before dealing with the proceeding on merits.

In the case of Hakim Muhammad Buta and another v. Habib Ahmad

and others (PLD 1985 SC 153), the apex Court has also held as under:-

This Court had in Ahsan Ali v. District Judge (2) clearly laid down

that it was the duty of the Court to notice the point of limitation,

whether the plea of limitation was raised or not, and that a

waiver of the question of limitation is not permissible, even

where the period of limitation is prescribed by special or a local

law.

4. On the touchstone of the above referred dictums of the Hon ble

Supreme Court of Pakistan, it is observed that vide order dated

21.10.2024 the instant matter was rightly fixed for hearing and

deciding the question of limitation in the first instance. This Court is

conscious of the fact that primarily the matter in hand ought to be

decided as an objection case on the question of maintainability of the

instant appeal, but as the same has already been registered and a

number has also been assigned to the appeal as well as to the

application for the condonation of delay, therefore, I find it expedient

to decide the application for the condonation of delay (Crl. Misc.

No.2/2022) whereupon the fate of the criminal appeal (Crl. Appeal

No.481 of 2022) is depending.

5. Learned counsel for the appellant in support of the application

under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 for the condonation of

delay in filing of the appeal has argued that the appellant got the

knowledge about the passing of the impugned judgment on 11.03.2022

and he moved the application for obtaining certified copy of the

judgment on 12.03.2022, which was delivered on the same day and the

instant appeal was filed on 25.03.2022, therefore, the same was filed

within the prescribed period of limitation, reckoned from the date of

knowledge i.e. 11.03.2022. He has further argued that FIR in this case

was lodged by the complainant/appellant on behalf of SNGPL department in his official capacity and the period of limitation for

filing of the instant appeal would be considered as sixty days.

6. Heard. Record perused.

7. Although the application (Crl. Misc. No.2/2022) has been filed

while invoking the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908,

yet the learned counsel for the appellant has embarked on Article 157

of the Limitation Act, 1908, prescribed by the First Schedule under

Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1908, where the period of limitation for

filing an appeal has been provided as six months. I am afraid,

according to the provisions of subsection (2) of Section 29 of the

Limitation Act, 1908, the period of limitation provided by the First

Schedule under Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1908, is only applicable

to a matter where different period of limitation for preferring an

appeal is prescribed by any special or local law, and for the purpose of

determining any period of limitation prescribed for any

suit/appeal/application by any special or local law:

(a) the provisions contained in section 4, sections 9 to 18, and

section 22 shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent of

which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local

law; and

(b) the remaining provisions of this Act shall not apply.

It is well settled by now that the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898

and the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 are to be treated as the special law

and not the general law, for the purpose of Limitation Act, 1908. The

provisions contained in Sections 4, 9 to 18 and 22 of the Limitation Act,

1908, as prescribed by clause (a) of subsection (2) of Section 29 of the

Limitation Act, 1908, shall apply to the special law, however, Section 5

of the Limitation Act, 1908 for not finding mention in Section 29 ibid.

shall not be applicable in this regard, as clause (b) of subsection (2) of

Section 29 of the Limitation Act, 1908 provides that all the remaining

provisions of this Act shall not apply. In this context, reliance is placed

on the dictum of the Hon ble Supreme Court of Pakistan reported as

Hafeez Ahmad and others v. Civil Judge, Lahore and others (PLD 2012

SC 400), wherein it has been held as under:-

A look at the above quoted paragraphs reveals that though the Code

of Criminal Procedure is a general procedural law yet it has

been treated as a special law inasmuch as it prescribed a period

of limitation for filing a petition for leave to appeal. The Code of

Civil Procedure as held above, despite being a general law, is a

special law within the terms of section 29 of the Act. We,

therefore, hold that section 4, sections 9 to 18 and section 22 of

the Limitation Act would be applicable even to a petition filed under section 15 of the Code. Any time consumed for obtaining

certified copies of pleadings, documents and order required in

support of such petition would thus be excluded. It may,

however, be made clear that section 5 of the Limitation Act shall

not be applicable to such petition as it does not find mention in

section 29 of the Limitation Act.

8. Subsection (2-A) of Section 417 Cr.P.C ordains that A person

aggrieved by the order of acquittal passed by any Court other than a

High Court, may, within thirty days file an appeal against such order .

The said period of thirty days will run from the date of passing of the

order of acquittal and not from the date of knowledge. Therefore, the

contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the instant

appeal has been filed within the prescribed period of limitation

reckoned from the date of knowledge i.e. 11.03.2022, is not tenable. For

the other contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that

SNGPL is a government department, it may be observed that Sui

Northern Gas Pipelines Limited (SNGPL) was incorporated as a private

limited company and then converted into a public limited company

under the Companies Act, 2017, which Act was enacted with the

objective of facilitating corporatization and promoting development of

corporate sector, encouraging use of technology and electronic means

in conduct of business and regulation thereof, regulating corporate

entities for protecting interests of shareholders, creditors, other

stakeholders and general public, inculcating principles of good

governance and safeguarding minority interests in corporate entities

and providing any alternate mechanism for expeditious resolution of

corporate disputes and matters arising out of or connected therewith.

A limited company is a business where the owners assets and income

are separate and distinct from the company s assets and income, and it

is also called as a private company . The mode of forming a company

has been described in Section 14 of the Companies Act, 2017 in the

manner that (a) three or more persons associated for any lawful

purpose may form a public company, (b) Two or more persons so

associated may form a private company and (c) one person may form a

single member company by complying with the requirements in

respect of registration of a private company and such other

requirements as may be specified. In other words, the persons forming

a private company are the legal persons who have established the

legal entities through a law, such as public companies, private

companies, limited liability partnerships, associations etc., registered

under the Companies Act, 2017. Thus, it can safely be inferred that a

company is a person created by law, which can sue and be sued except

that it cannot be jailed or hanged, so it comes within the meaning of A

person as given in subsection (2-A) of Section 417 Cr.P.C. Therefore, due to the bar contained in clauses (a) and (b) of subsection (2) of

Section 29 of the Limitation Act, 1908 and there being the special

limitation of thirty days prescribed by the above-mentioned statue, the

provisions of Section 5 and Article 157 of the Limitation Act, 1908 have

lost their applicability or relevancy over the matter in hand.

9. It may further be observed that lapse of time in a criminal matter

is sufficient to provide protection to a person, who has been acquitted,

against further judicial process by way of filing of an appeal against

his acquittal. In the dictum reported as Fakhar-ud-Din v. Fazal Karim

and others (1999 SCMR 795), the Hon ble Supreme Court of Pakistan

has endorsed the view expressed in the cases of Piran Ditta v. The State

and others (1970 SCMR 282) and Mst. Zeenat Sultan v. Mumtaz Khan

etc. (PLD 1994 SC 667), wherein it was inter alia held as under:-

The convict might be placed once again in peril of his life by a

petition of this kind, and it is for this reason that the technical

requirement of limitation assumes importance. It is not too

much to ask that he who seeks to place his fellow-citizens life in

peril, by legal process, should satisfy all the technical

requirements of that process.

The right to life is the basic right that human beings process. Once a

charge for a capital offence, duly tried, results in acquittal, the

accused person acquires a very precious right and he should not,

therefore, be put in jeopardy of his life by a petition for leave to

appeal filed out of time. The law that enables interference with

the acquittal must, therefore, be strictly applied in favour of the

accused person.

10. In view of all above, I am of the considered view that the

provision of condonation of delay under Section 5 and Article 157 of

the Limitation Act, 1908 is not available for filing of an appeal against

acquittal. Hence, Crl. Misc. No.2/2022 is hereby rejected and the instant

appeal is dismissed being barred by time.

JK/M-189/L Appeal dismissed.