2026 P Cr. L J 554

 2026 P Cr. L J 554

[Lahore (Bahawalpur Bench)]

Before Tariq Saleem Sheikh and Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan, JJ

MUHAMMAD SIDDIQUE---Appellant

Versus

The STATE and another---Respondents

Criminal Appeal No. 9 of 2025, heard on 12th May, 2025.

(a) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)---

----Ss. 8, 9, 11-F(2), 11-G(2) & 11-W(2)---Prohibition of acts intended

or likely to stir up sectarian hatred, proscribed organization,

support and meetings relating to a proscribed organization,

projection of proscribed organization, act of terrorism---Appreciation

of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Prosecution case was that 22

pamphlets containing hate statements against the Shia community,

stickers, cellphone and other material were recovered from the

appellant---Trial Court acquitted the appellant of the charge under

S.9 of the Act, 1997---Prosecution witnesses confirmed that the hate

pamphlets and stickers were recovered from an envelope and were

neither in open view nor otherwise visible---Said witnesses admitted

that the appellant did not distribute hate pamphlets or stickers to

anyone in their presence---Said witnesses had not seen the appellant

engaging in any activity linked to a proscribed organization---No

private person came forward to confirm any such connection---Trial

Court recorded a categoric findings that the prosecution had failed

to prove that the appellant had projected, supported, propagated or

promoted SSP terrorists with intent to incite sectarian hatred---Trial

Court interpreted S.8 of the Act, 1997, in accordance with the

statutory and the evidence on record and therefore, rightly

acquitted the appellant of the charge under S.9---To that extent,

appeal was disposed of.

(b) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)---

----Ss. 8, 9, 11-F(2), 11-G(2) & 11-W(2)---Prohibition of acts intended

or likely to stir up sectarian hatred,proscribed organization, support

and meetings relating to a proscribed organization, projection of

proscribed organization, act of terrorism---Appreciation of evidence---

Benefit of doubt---Accused acquitted under a different section 9 of the

Act, 1997 on same set of evidence---Effect--- Prosecution case was that

22 pamphlets containing hate statements against the Shia

community, stickers, cell phone and other material were recovered

from the appellant---Trial Court convicted the appellant under S.11 G of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, on the ground that possession of

the objectionable pamphlets and stickers indicated appellant s

membership and support for the proscribed organization---

Appellant s conviction under S.11-G of the Act, 1997, was

unsustainable because it was based on the same evidence for which

he was acquitted under S.9---Once the Court found that the material

had not been distributed or displayed, was recovered in the

concealed form, and was unsupported by corroborating evidence of

affiliation, a conviction under S.11-G could not follow---To the extent

of said offence, appeal was allowed, in circumstances.

Bourne (Inspector of Taxes) v. Norwich Crematorium Ltd. [1967) 1

WLR 691; Shakeel Shah v. The State and others 2022 SCMR 1;

Barkhurdar v. Appellate Tribunal/Additional District and Sessions

Judge, and others PLD 2016 Lah. 101; M/s Asfaq Trading Company v.

Collector of Customs 2016 PTD 2111 and Messrs Kashmir Pottery

Works v. The Commissioner of Sales Tax PLD 1973 Lah. 837 = 1973 PTD

453 rel.

Syed Zeeshan Haider for Appellant.

Ch. Asghar Ali Gill, Deputy/Prosecutor General with Farrukh

Zareen/Inspector and Muhammad Zubair/SI, CTD for the State.

Date of hearing: 12th May, 2025.

JUDGMENT

TARIQ SALEEM SHEIKH, J.---This appeal is directed against the

judgment dated 19.12.2024 delivered by the Judge, Anti-Terrorism

Court, Bahawalpur (the ATC Judge ), in case FIR No.25/2024 dated

21.06.2024 registered at Police Station CTD Bahawalpur.

2. The brief facts of the case are that on 21.06.2024, PW-2 Zubair

Ahmad 36/UO (the Complainant ) and his squad were on duty near

Asia Ghee Mills on KLP Road, Bahawalpur. Around 9:45 a.m., he

received information from a source that an individual was seen

distributing pamphlets and stickers containing sectarian content on

Bypass Road, Khanqah Sharif, which also lies along KLP Road.

According to the source, the individual was also urging the public to

join the proscribed organization, Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), in

contravention of the law. The source added that the perpetrator could

be arrested if immediate action was taken. Acting on this information,

at 9:55 a.m., the Complainant and his team reached the specified place

with the informer and found a man distributing pamphlets and

stickers to a group of people who had gathered on the roadside. As

soon as the man saw the police party, he attempted to flee while the

crowd dispersed. The Complainant apprehended the man, who

identified himself as Muhammad Siddique (the Appellant ). He checked the brown envelope he was holding in his right hand and

recovered 22 pamphlets containing a hate statement against the Shia

community along with a picture of Maulana Aurangzeb Farooqi (P-1/1-

22) and 17 stickers bearing the slogan and the image of SSP s

flag (P-2/1-17). The Appellant s personal search yielded a wallet (P-3)

containing his CNIC (P-4) and Rs.1120/- in cash (P-5), and a Redmi Note-

4 cellphone (P-6). The Complainant secured these items through

Recovery Memo. Exh. PB. After that, he drafted the complaint Exh. PC

and sent it to Police Station CTD, Bahawalpur, through Muhammad

Zaigham 799/UO. Based on the said complaint, Mudassar Asghar

795/CPL (PW-1) registered FIR No. 25/2024 (Exh. PA) for offences under

sections 9, 11-F(2), 11-G(2), and 11-W(2) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997

(the ATA ).

3. Muhammad Imran Javed/Inspector (PW-4) investigated the case.

On 25.06.2024, he obtained the sealed parcel containing the cellphone

from the Moharrar and deposited it the same day at the PFSA Crime

Scene Unit, Bahawalpur. On 31.07.2024, he received the forensic report

Exh. PG, and a USB (P-7) from the PFSA. He handed them over to

Amjad Hussain 1175/UO (PW-3), who retrieved data from the USB and

took print-outs P-8/1-14. Subsequently, Amjad Hussain gave the said

USB, print-outs, and the PFSA report to the Investigating Officer in the

presence of Muhammad Asif 34/UO. During the investigation, PW

Muhammad Imran/Inspector found that the Appellant had committed

the alleged offence. The report under section 173 Cr.P.C. was submitted

accordingly.

4. On 16.11.2024, the ATC Judge indicted the Appellant under

sections 9 and 11-G of the ATA. Notably, FIR No. 25/2024 had been

registered for offences under sections 9, 11-F(2), 11-G(2), and 11-W(2)

of the ATA. The allegations under sections 11-F(2) and 11-W(2) were

either dropped or the trial court found that there was insufficient

evidence to charge the Appellant for them.

5. The Appellant pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. To prove its

case, the prosecution produced four witnesses. Mudassar Asghar

795/CPL (PW-1) registered FIR No.25/2024 Exh. PA. Complainant Zubair

Ahmad 36/UO (PW-2) and Amjad Hussain 1175/UO (PW-3) testified

regarding the recovery of 22 pamphlets (P-1/1-22) and 17 stickers (P-

2/1-17) containing offensive writings, wallet (P-3), CNIC (P-4), Rs.1120/-

in cash (P-5), and a Redmi Note-4 cellphone (P-6) from the Appellant.

Muhammad Imran/Inspector (PW-4) gave details of his investigation.

In documentary evidence, the prosecution inter alia adduced the PFSA

report Exh. PG.

6. After the prosecution completed its evidence, the ATC Judge

recorded the Appellant s statement under section 342 Cr.P.C. and confronted him with the incriminating material brought against him

during the trial. The Appellant denied the allegations and professed

innocence. He asserted that no incident occurred as alleged in the FIR,

that he had no connection with any proscribed organization, and that he

neither distributed nor possessed the pamphlets or stickers attributed to

him. He termed the alleged recoveries bogus. The Appellant claimed that

the CTD officials illegally detained him before the alleged occurrence and

later implicated him in this case to cover their misconduct. As for the

PFSA report, he submitted that while in custody, the officials had

downloaded images of leaders of the banned organization onto a

cellphone and then planted it on him to fabricate evidence. The

Appellant did not make a statement under section 340(2) Cr.P.C. or

produce any witness in his defence.

7. At the conclusion of the trial, vide impugned judgment dated

19.12.2024, the ATC Judge acquitted the Appellant of the charge under

section 9 of the ATA but convicted him under section 11-G and

sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for five days.

8. The State has not challenged the Appellant s acquittal under

section 9 of the ATA. However, the Appellant has filed this appeal

against his conviction under section 11-G. Although he has already

undergone the sentence awarded to him, the conviction carries a

stigma and potential legal consequences. Therefore, he seeks to have it

set aside through this appeal.

9. Syed Zeeshan Haider, Advocate, contended that the case against

the Appellant was false and that the alleged recoveries were planted.

According to him, this was evident from serious contradictions in the

prosecution evidence. He further argued that the trial court had

misconstrued section 11-G of the ATA. The available evidence did not

satisfy the statutory elements of the offence. Additionally, the trial

court s findings under sections 9 and 11-G were inconsistent: it

acquitted the Appellant under section 9 but convicted him under

section 11-G on the same evidence without any corroboration. Counsel

concluded that the conviction was unsustainable and prayed that the

appeal be allowed and the Appellant be acquitted.

10. Ch. Asghar Ali Gill, Deputy Prosecutor General (DPG), opposed

the appeal. He submitted that the prosecution had proved its case

through reliable evidence. All the prosecution witnesses, particularly

Complainant Zubair Ahmad 36/UO (PW-2) and Amjad Hussain 1175/UO

(PW-3), in whose presence the offensive pamphlets and stickers were

recovered from the Appellant, stood the test of cross-examination. The

Appellant could not impeach their credibility. The DPG maintained

that the trial court convicted and sentenced the Appellant after properly appreciating the applicable law and the evidence brought on

the record. Hence, the appeal was liable to be dismissed.

11. Heard. Record perused.

12. The prosecution sought to prove the allegations in FIR No. 25/2024

through Complainant Zubair Ahmad 36/UO (PW-2) and Amjad Hussain

1175/UO (PW-3). They deposed in line with the FIR and confirmed that on

21.06.2024 at 9:55 a.m., the Appellant was arrested from KLP Road,

Bahawalpur, while distributing pamphlets and stickers containing

sectarian content and that pamphlets P-1/1-22 and stickers P-2/1-17 were

seized from him. However, during cross-examination, the Complainant

stated:

It was my source who disclosed before me regarding the

distribution of pamphlets and stickers, but said source is not

witness in this case. As per my narration before this Court, the

pamphlets and stickers were found in an envelope. No pamphlet

or sticker was found in open/visible condition from the hand of

accused. I did not mention the number of persons to whom

accused was allegedly distributing pamphlets and stickers No

person joined in the investigation who claimed that accused had

distributed pamphlets or stickers to him No private person

appeared before I.O. in my presence claiming that he had

witnessed accused ever distributing stickers or pamphlets of

defunct organization for spreading alleged sectarianism. No

private person appeared before I.O. in my presence claiming

that accused had any link with any defunct organization.

13. PW Amjad Hussain also conceded that the Appellant was not

openly exhibiting the pamphlets or stickers at the time of arrest and

that in our presence, no pamphlet or sticker was distributed by the

accused to anyone. Importantly, the Investigating Officer, Muhammad

Imran Javed/Inspector (PW-4), confirmed in his cross-examination that

no bystander or member of the public had joined the investigation to

claim that he received or witnessed the distribution of the material. He

further acknowledged that he relied solely on the statements of the

Complainant and PWs for his determination that the Appellant had

links with SSP and that no independent evidence was available in that

regard.

14. The ATC Judge accepted the prosecution version to the extent of

the raid and the recovery of the offensive material from the Appellant.

He rejected the Appellant s defence that the cellphone had been

planted and the evidence fabricated.

15. The ATC Judge acquitted the Appellant of the charge under

section 9 of the ATA for the following reasons: first, Zubair Ahmad 36/UO (PW-2) and Amjad Hussain 1175/UO (PW-3) confirmed that the

hate pamphlets and stickers were recovered from an envelope and

were neither in open view nor otherwise visible. Second, they

admitted that the Appellant did not distribute hate pamphlets or

stickers to anyone in their presence. Third, they had not seen the

Appellant engage in any activity linked to a proscribed organization.

Fourth, no private person came forward to confirm any such

connection. Importantly, the court recorded a categoric finding that

the prosecution had failed to prove that the Appellant had projected,

supported, propagated, or promoted SSP or glorified terrorists with

intent to incite sectarian hatred.

16. The ATC Judge convicted the Appellant under section 11-G of the

ATA on the ground that possession of the objectionable pamphlets (P-

1/1-22) and stickers (P-2/1-17) indicated the Appellant s membership

and support for SSP. He relied on the material extracted from the

Appellant s cellphone (P-6), USB (P-7), and the PFSA report (Exh. PG) to

reinforce this inference.

17. The ATC Judge s findings are inconsistent. They raise a critical

legal issue: whether the elements required to establish an offence

under section 11-G were satisfied in this case. Specifically, whether

mere possession of offensive material constitutes an offence under

section 11-G and, if so, whether it is sufficient to prove that the

Appellant was a member or supporter of a proscribed organization.

These questions require a closer analysis of the testimonies of the

prosecution witnesses, the reasoning of the trial court, and the

relevant statutory provisions.

18. We begin with section 8 of the ATA.

[1]

It prohibits various acts to

prevent sectarian hatred. These include using threatening, abusive, or

insulting words, behaviour, images, or sounds, as well as displaying,

publishing, or distributing material containing such content, and

possessing it with a view to its being displayed or published. The

offence is complete if either of two conditions is met: first, the person

commits the act with the intent to stir up sectarian hatred; or second,

in the given circumstances, sectarian hatred is likely to be thereby

stirred up. The law thus targets both deliberate incitement and

conduct that creates a real risk of sectarian conflict. Section 9 of the

ATA sets out the punishment for committing an offence under section

8. It stipulates that a person who commits such an offence is liable to

imprisonment, a fine, or both.

19. Section 11-G(1) of the ATA creates two distinct offences: clause

(a) prohibits wearing, carrying, or displaying articles, symbols, flags,

or banners associated with a proscribed organization, while clause (b) prohibits wearing or displaying any uniform or item of clothing in

circumstances that arouse reasonable suspicion of membership or

support of such body. Section 11-G(2) prescribes the punishment for

the offence, which may include imprisonment, a fine, or both.

[2]

20. It is noteworthy that although section 8(d) and section 11-G(1) of

the ATA both refer to possession or carrying of material linked to

sectarian or extremist activity, they criminalize different forms of

conduct. Section 8(d) applies to possessing threatening, abusive, or

insulting material intended or likely to stir up sectarian hatred. It is

content-based and applies only where the material is provocative and

held for public dissemination. In contrast, section 11-G(1) is concerned

with the visible association of the material with a proscribed

organization rather than its content. It penalizes wearing, carrying, or

displaying items such as flags, banners, or uniforms linked to such

groups, even if they are not abusive or insulting, regardless of intent to

incite hatred. Significantly, mere possession does not constitute an

offence under either provision. In both cases, criminal liability arises

only when further elements are established, such as intent or likely

effect under section 8(d) and public display or circumstances giving

rise to reasonable suspicion under section 11-G(1).

21. The DPG, however, disagreed with the above interpretation. He

submitted that the word carries in section 11-G(1)(a) includes

possession simpliciter and includes situations where an individual

transports the prohibited material in a concealed manner. Referring to

the facts of the present case, the DPG contended that since the

envelope was in the Appellant s hand at the time of recovery, it

constituted carrying within the meaning of section 11-G(1)(a).

22. According to Black s Law Dictionary (9th ed.), the word carry has

several meanings, including the following: (i) to convey or transport,

(ii) to possess and convey (a firearm) in a vehicle, including the locked

glove compartment or trunk of a car, (iii) figuratively, to possess or

hold (insurance, etc.). However, section 11-G does not use carries in

isolation. It appears alongside other terms. In such a situation, the

maxim noscitur a sociis dictates that it must be construed in their light

and colour. Bennion explains:

A statutory term is recognised by its associated words. The Latin

maxim noscitur a sociis states this contextual principle A word or

phrase in an enactment must always be construed in the light of the

words, and particularly general words, cannot be read in isolation;

their colour and their content are derived from their context. 

[3]

23. Crawford states: In order to ascertain the meaning of any word or phrase that is

ambiguous or susceptible to more than one meaning, the court may

properly resort to the other words which the ambiguous word is

associated in the statute. Accordingly, if several words are

connected by a copulative conjunction, a presumption arises that

they are of the same class unless, of course, a contrary intention is

indicated.

[4]

24. In Bourne (Inspector of Taxes) v. Norwich Crematorium Ltd.

[1967] 1 WLR 691, at 696, Stamp J. stated:

English words derive colour from those which surround them.

Sentences are not mere collections of words to be taken out of the

sentence, defined separately by reference to the dictionary or

decided cases, and then put back into the sentence with the meaning

which you have assigned to them as separate words ...

25. The principle of noscitur a sociis must be distinguished from the

doctrine of ejusdem generis, which states that where general words

follow the designation of particular things or classes of persons or

subjects, the general words will usually be construed to include only

those persons or things of the same class or general nature as those

specifically enumerated. For example, where a law prohibits the

exclusion of any persons on account of their color from barber shops,

eating houses, or other places of public resort, the latter phrase will be

restricted to places of the same general character of those specifically

enumerated.

[5]

. S.M. Zafar states that the two maxims operate in most

situations identically, but there is a slight difference between them.

[6]

26. The principle of noscitur a sociis was judicially recognized in our

country in Shakeel Shah v. The State and others (2022 SCMR 1),

Barkhurdar v. Appellate Tribunal/Additional District and Sessions

Judge, and others (PLD 2016 Lah.101) (FB), M/s Asfaq Trading Company

v. Collector of Customs (2016 PTD 2111), Messrs Kashmir Pottery Works

v. The Commissioner of Sales Tax (PLD 1973 Lah.837 : 1973 PTD 453).

27. In subsection (1) of section 11-G of the ATA, the Legislature has

used the word carries alongside wears and displays in two distinct

clauses. In clause (a), it occurs between wears and displays , which are

followed by the phrase any article, symbol, or any flag or banner. In

clause (b), the same three words precede the phrase any uniform, item

of clothing, or dress. Applying the principles discussed above, the

word carries in section 11-G does not mean mere possession in the

general or passive sense but connotes carrying in a way that is visible

or suggestive of support or membership of a proscribed organization. It must involve public presentation (such as wearing or displaying

emblems, articles, or other material at rallies, group events, or other

conduct indicating active affiliation). The prosecution must meet this

evidentiary threshold to secure a conviction under section 11-G.

28. The ATC Judge interpreted section 8 of the ATA in accordance

with the statutory language and the evidence on record and, therefore,

rightly acquitted the Appellant of the charge under section 9.

However, his interpretation of section 11-G was flawed. The Appellant

s conviction under that provision rests on a misconstruction of the

word carries .

29. The DPG s argument that since the envelope was in the Appellant

s hand at the time of recovery, it constituted carrying under section 11-

G(1)(a) of the ATA is not tenable. As discussed above, the act of holding

an envelope, without more, does not satisfy the statutory threshold of

carrying under section 11-G(1)(a).

30. Even if the Appellant s act did not amount to carrying within the

meaning of clause (a) of section 11-G(1) of the ATA, it is still necessary

to consider whether his conduct fell within clause (b). That provision

does not require proof of actual support or membership of a

proscribed organization but turns on whether the circumstances in

which an article, item of clothing, or dress is worn, carried, or

displayed could arouse a reasonable suspicion of such affiliation. In

the present case, the prosecution brought no evidence suggesting that

the Appellant was associated with SSP or that any surrounding

circumstances could reasonably raise such suspicion. The material

was recovered in a concealed form and was not linked to any public

display, group event, or act indicative of affiliation. Its mere recovery,

without more, was insufficient to meet the requirements of section 11-

G(1)(b).

31. The Appellant s conviction under section 11-G of the ATA is also

unsustainable because it was based on the same evidence for which he

was acquitted under section 9. Once the court found that the material

had not been distributed or displayed, was recovered in a concealed

form, and was unsupported by corroborating evidence of affiliation, a

conviction under section 11-G could not follow.

32. In view of the foregoing, we accept this appeal and set aside the

impugned judgment dated 19.12.2024. The Appellant is acquitted of the

charge under section 11-G of the ATA. Although the sentence awarded

to him was short and already served, the conviction carried potential

reputational, legal, and collateral consequences, which have now been

removed.

JKM-201/L Appeal allowed.