2026 P Cr. L J 289

 2026 P Cr. L J 289

[Sindh]

Before Zafar Ahmed Rajput and Miran Muhammad Shah, JJ

GULZAR ALI---Applicant

Versus

The STATE---Respondent

Criminal Revision Application No. 116 of 2024, decided on 7th August,

2025.

Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)---

----Ss. 7 & 23---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302(b), 353, 392, 397 &

34---Qatl-i-amd, using assault or criminal force against a public

servant, robbery, committing robbery or dacoity with a deadly

weapons---Transfer of case from Anti-Terrorism Court to Ordinary

Courts---Scope---Application of the accused/applicant for the transfer

of case from Special Court to Ordinary Court was dismissed---

Validity---Accused were charged that they made firing upon the

police party, due to which two Police Officials were shot and died---

In the instant case, the applicant was facing the charge of acting

violently against police force in the execution of their duties and

offered armed resistance against law enforcers, which act of the

applicant falling under clauses (n) and (o) Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997,

came within the prescribed definition of "terrorism" assigning

jurisdiction to the Trial Court being Anti-Terrorism Court to take the

cognizance of the offence---Record revealed prima facie that the act

in question was committed by the accused with full intention and

mens rea to deter their arrest at the hands of law enforcers---In that

regard, the term "action" was more appropriate and carried greater

legal weight than the expression "designed to"---Incident took place

in a thickly populated locality, where members of the Shaheen Force

were performing patrolling duty to prevent and control crimes---

Attack created alarm, panic and fear in the minds of the public,

leaving the clear impression that if Police Officials themselves were

not safe, then ordinary citizens could not expect protection---

Therefore, it was evident that this was not a case of personal enmity

or private vendetta; rather, it was a deliberate, intentional and

armed assault upon law enforcers in the discharge of their lawful

duty---Such action could neither have remained unnoticed by the

locality nor could it be considered an ordinary offence, as its effect

was to spread intimidation, insecurity and a sense of lawlessness

amongst the public at large---Incident, in which one Police Constable

lost his life was of a grave and serious nature and, if left unchecked, would directly erode public confidence in law enforcement and the

writ of the State---Such attacks on Police Officials strike at the very

fabric of society, amounting to an assault not only on individual

officers but on the society and State itself---Calculation of accused

was to create fear, insecurity and terror both in the minds of the

public and within the ranks of law enforcement agencies---

Consequently, the alleged act clearly fell within the parameters of

clauses (b) and (c) of subsection (1) of S.6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act,

1997, and could not be brought within the jurisdiction of the regular

Sessions Court---Criminal revision application was dismissed,

accordingly.

Ali Gohar and others v. Pervaiz Ahmed and others PLD 2020 SC 427;

Ghulam Hussain and others v. The State and others PLD 2020 SC 61;

Ahmed Shah and another v. The State 2003 YLR 1977 and Muhammad

Nawaz v. The State and another 2024 YLR 670 ref.

Barrister Mudassir Khan for Applicant.

Ms. Rubina Qadir, Deputy Prosecutor General, Sindh (DPG) for the

State.

Date of hearing: 7th August, 2025.

ORDER

ZAFAR AHMED RAJPUT, J.---Impugned in this Crl. Revision

Application is the order dated 17.05.2024, whereby the Anti-Terrorism

Court No. XVI, Karachi ( Trial Court ) dismissed an application under

Section 23 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 ( the Act ), filed by the

applicant/accused for transfer of cases bearing Special Case

No.240/2022 (Old Special Case No.573/ 2022) arising out of FIR No.336

of 2022, registered under Sections 302, 353, 392, 397/34, P.P.C., read

with section 7 of the Act at P.S. Pak Colony, Karachi and Special Case

No.241-A/2022 (Old Special Case No.573-A/2022) arising out of FIR

No.82 of 2022, registered under Section 23(1)(a) of the Sindh Arms Act,

2013 at P.S. CTD, Karachi from the Trial Court to regular Sessions

Court.

2. Learned counsel has contended that the alleged offences do not

fall within the ambit of Sections 6 and 7 of the Act; that as per the

contents of the FIR No.336/2022, the motive and intent was of

committing robbery and there was no intention or motivation for

causing terror; that the alleged act of the accused shows no intent,

purpose or design to create terror or sense of terror; that the causing

of murder of a police official was not the primary intention of the

accused but a by-product; hence, there arises no question of creating

fear or insecurity among the general public; that in terms of Section 6 of the Act, the use or threat of action within the meaning of terrorism

must be designed to achieve any of the objectives specified in clause

(b) of subsection (1) of Section 6 and/or the use or threat of such action

must be to achieve any of the purposes mentioned in clause (c) of

subsection (1) of Section 6 of the Act, which is missing in the case;

therefore, the alleged offence(s) are triable by the regular Sessions

Court. In support of his contentions, he has relied upon the cases of (i)

Ali Gohar and others v. Pervaiz Ahmed and others (PLD 2020 SC 427),

(ii) Ghulam Hussain and others v. The State and others (PLD 2020 SC

61), (iii) Ahmed Shah and another v. The State (2003 YLR 1977) and (iv)

Muhammad Nawaz v. The State and another (2024 YLR 670).

3. Conversely, learned DPG has maintained that since the alleged

action of the accused squarely falls within the ambit of clauses (n) and

(o) of subsection (2) of Section 6 of the Act, the Trial Court, established

under Section 13 of the Act, has the exclusive jurisdiction to take

cognizance of the offence.

4. Heard. Record perused.

5. It reflects from the record that, on 19.10.2022 at Bara Board

Chowk, Main Manghopir Road, Karachi, two unknown armed

muggers robbed Rs. 4,00,000/- from one Shakeel Ahmed Khan, 39, and

upon his resistance, they opened fire causing him injuries. During the

incident, police constables of Shaheen Force, engaged in patrolling

duty on motorcycles in the area, reached the spot. The muggers also

fired on them, resulting in firearm injuries to PC Nihaluddin. Both

the injured, Shakeel Ahmed Khan and PC Nihaluddin succumbed to

their injuries. The muggers managed to flee while firing chaotically,

thereby causing fear and panic at a public place. Later, accused

Gulzar Ali (applicant) and Zahid Husain were arrested by CTD,

Karachi; after investigation, police submitted charge-sheet against

them before the Trial Court.

6. The case in hand pertains to the jurisdiction of the Trial Court to

try the alleged offence as a Scheduled Offence of the Act. Under

Section 12 of the Act, an Anti-Terrorism Court ( ATC ) has jurisdiction

to try a scheduled offence. The term scheduled offence has been

defined under Section 2(t) of the Act as an offence as set out in the

Third Schedule. The entry No. 1 of the Third Schedule of the Act

specifies any act of terrorism within the meaning of the Act as

scheduled offence. Term terrorism has been defined under section 6 of

the Act of 1997, as under:

6. Terrorism. - (1) In this Act. terrorism means the use or threat of

action where:

(a) the action falls with the meaning of subsection (2), and (b) the use or threat is designed to coerce and intimidate or overawe

the Government or the public or a section of the public or

community or sect or a foreign government or population or an

international organization or create a sense of fear or insecurity

in society; or

(c) the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a

religious, sectarian or ethnic cause or intimidating or terrorizing

the public, social sector, medias person, business community or

attacking the civilians, including damaging property by

ransacking, looting, arson or by any other means, government

officials, installations, security forces or law enforcement

agencies:

Provided that nothing herein contained shall apply to a democratic

and religious rally or a peaceful demonstration in accordance

with law.

(2) An action shall fall within the meaning of subsection (1), if it

(a) involves the doing or anything that causes death;

(b) involves grievous violence against a person or grievous body

injury or harm to person;

(c) -----------------------------------------------;

(d) -----------------------------------------------;

(e) -----------------------------------------------;

(ee) -----------------------------------------------;

(f) -----------------------------------------------;

(g) -----------------------------------------------;

(h) -----------------------------------------------;

(i) -----------------------------------------------;

(j) -----------------------------------------------;

(k) -----------------------------------------------;

(l) -----------------------------------------------;

(m) -----------------------------------------------;

(n) involves serious violence against a member of the police force,

armed forces, civil armed forces, or a public servant; or

(o) involves in acts as part of armed resistance by groups or

individuals against law enforcement agencies; or (3) The use or threat or use of any action falling within subsection

(2) which involves the use of fire-arms, explosives or any other

weapon, is terrorism, whether or not subsection 1 (c) is satisfied.

(3A) -----------------------------------------------;

(4) -----------------------------------------------;

(5) -----------------------------------------------;

(6) -----------------------------------------------;

(7) -----------------------------------------------;

(Emphasis supplied)

7. It may be perceived from the perusal of aforementioned

definitions of the term terrorism provided under clauses (n) and (o) of

subsection (2) of Section 6 of the Act of 1997 that an action involving

serious violence against a member of the police force, armed forces,

civil armed forces, or a public servant; or involving in acts as part of

armed resistance by groups or individuals against law enforcement

agencies falls within the prescribed definitions. In the instant case, the

applicant is facing the charge of acting violently against police force in

the execution of their duties and offered armed resistance against law

enforcers, which act of the applicant being falling under clauses (n)

and (o) ibid comes within the prescribed definition of terrorism

assigning jurisdiction to the Trial Court being ATC to take the

cognizance of the offence.

8. As regards the contentions of the learned counsel for the

applicant, it may be observed that the dictum laid down by the Apex

Court in the case of Ghulam Hussain (supra) elucidates heinous

offences by referring the offences specified in entry No.4 of the Third

Schedule to the Act that such heinous offences specified in entry No.4

that do not inherently qualify as terrorism, are to be tried by an ATC

due to their inclusion in the Third Schedule, and the ATC can impose

a punishment appropriate for the specific offence, rather than for the

offence of terrorism itself. However, not all heinous offences,

regardless of their seriousness, brutality, or shocking nature,

automatically qualify as acts of terrorism, which is a distinct category

of crime.

9. So far as the contentions of learned counsel for the applicant

regarding intent, purpose and design to create terror, and the murder

of a police official being a by-product is concerned, the record reveals

prima facie that the act in question was committed by the accused

with full intention and mens rea to deter their arrest at the hands of

law enforcers. In this regard, the term action is more appropriate and carries greater legal weight than the expression designed to . The

incident took place in a thickly populated locality, where members of

the Shaheen Force were performing patrolling duty to prevent and

control crimes. The attack created alarm, panic and fear in the minds

of the public, leaving the clear impression that if police officials

themselves were not safe, then ordinary citizens could not expect

protection. It is therefore evident that this was not a case of personal

enmity or private vendetta; rather, it was a deliberate, intentional

and armed assault upon law enforcers in the discharge of their

lawful duty. Such action could neither have remained unnoticed by

the locality nor can it be considered an ordinary offence, as its effect

was to spread intimidation, insecurity and a sense of lawlessness

amongst the public at large. The incident, in which one police

constable, PC Nihaluddin, lost his life, was of a grave and serious

nature and, if left unchecked, would directly erode public confidence

in law enforcement and the writ of the State. Such attacks on police

officials strike at the very fabric of society, amounting to an assault

not only on individual officers but on the society and State itself.

They are calculated to create fear, insecurity and terror both in the

minds of the public and within the ranks of law enforcement

agencies. Consequently, the alleged act clearly falls within the

parameters of clauses (b) and (c) of subsection (1) of Section 6 of the

Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, and cannot be brought within the

jurisdiction of the regular Sessions Court. The case-law cited by the

learned counsel for the applicant being on different footings does not

advance the case of the applicant for transfer of aforementioned

cases to regular Sessions Court.

10. For the foregoing facts, discussion and reasons, we do not find

any illegality or irregularity in the impugned order requiring any

interference of this Court under its revisional jurisdiction; hence, this

Crl. Revision Application is dismissed, accordingly.

11. Above are the reasons of our short order dated 07.08.2025.

JK/G-25/Sindh Revision dismissed.